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Choose One: Gainful Employment or Religious
Obedience – An Analysis of Samira Achbita v. G4S
Shane Simms

Abstract
Freedom of religious expression is a fundamental human right that pervades both
international and domestic law, yet this right is not absolute. This holds particularly true when
one’s religious mandates conflict with the rights of others. This Comment explores this tension
in the context of the recent ruling by the European Court of Justice in Samira Achbita v.
G4S. The court ruled that an employer can establish a general policy that forbids the wearing
of religious symbols and attire in the workplace because it does not constitute direct
discrimination. This ruling suggests that a private employer’s right to conduct business according
to his or her wishes is equally important, if not more so, to the fundamental right to manifest
one’s religious beliefs. Although such policies must be facially neutral to avoid the moniker of
discrimination, followers of religions with clothing mandates, such as Muslim women, are
affected to a greater degree than followers of religions without such mandates, atheists, and
secular individuals. This Comment considers this disparity by analyzing both European Union
law and international law generally, suggesting a potential conflict between the two.
International law provides broad and rigid protections for the freedom of religious expression,
whereas E.U. law has developed a more granular and specific approach. This latter approach
may not sufficiently protect freedom of religion as envisioned under international law.



I would like to personally thank Holly Berlin, Michael Christ, Wallace Feng, Sam Fuller,
Myungkoo Kang, Beth Macnab, Benjamin Moss, Kyle Trevett, and the entire Chicago Journal of
International Law staff for helping me craft this Comment on a topic I am particularly passionate
about. I am eternally grateful for the countless hours spent researching, revising, and editing. I
also want to specifically thank Samira Achbita. Although I have not personally met her, she
nonetheless inspires me by her willingness to stand up for what she believes in.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
Perhaps one of the most salient characteristics of a free society is the ability
of an individual to develop or adopt any set of beliefs; some of which transform
into pure convictions—creeds by which people live and manifest their identities.
Yet, another hallmark of a free society, especially one which also operates under
a free market economy, is the individual liberty to operate a commercial business
according to one’s desires. As aptly noted by Aristotle in Book II of his Politics:
“if different people attend to different things, no mutual accusations result, and
they will together contribute more, since each person keeps his mind on his own
proper concerns.”1 From an economics standpoint, assuming the persuasive
force of Aristotle’s argument, business owners can increase output and thus
enhance social welfare when they can conduct business per the policies they
deem appropriate.
Yet no rational individual could assume that either of these attributes of a
free society should exist without limit. True, an individual can believe virtually
anything, but surely society would not allow individuals to manifest beliefs via
conduct that impinges upon the fundamental rights of other citizens. By that
same token, no society will last long that allows business owners to set openly
harmful policies with impunity. Removing a sense of benevolence from the
equation, a business owner is freest when the company operates precisely to the
owner’s specifications without making concessions for the rights of
subordinates. This, however, is not the efficient outcome. As a result, when
these two fundamental rights of free citizens come into conflict, the critical
inquiry is which right gives way to the other and does the answer to that
question change depending on both the circumstances and the degree of
suppression that results from the compromise?
This Comment seeks to explore the balance between the right to follow the
mandates of one’s religion—the pinnacle of individualized belief—and the right
of an employer to control the conduct of their employees in the workplace. The
resulting implications will be explored in the context of the recent ruling by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Samira Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV,2 as
well as the related Opinion of Advocate General J. Kokott (AG)3 upon which
the ECJ relied in reaching its determination. In this case, the ECJ issued a
preliminary ruling stating that an employer may institute a blanket ban on the
1

ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE: SELECTIONS 464 (Terence Irwin & Gail Fine trans., 1995).

2

Judgment of 14 March 2017, Samira Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, C‑157/15,
EU:C:2017:203.

3

Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 31 May 2016, Samira Achbita v. G4S Secure
Solutions NV, C‑157/15, EU:C:2016:382.

Winter 2019

617

Chicago Journal of International Law

wearing of religious symbols or apparel in the workplace, and that such a policy
would not constitute direct discrimination, although it could potentially qualify
as similarly unlawful indirect discrimination.4 This Comment begins with a brief
overview of the relevant facts surrounding this suit.
G4S Secure Solutions NV (G4S) is a publicly traded company that
provides security, guard, and reception services to various customers from the
public and private sectors.5 On June 12, 2006, Samira Achbita was terminated
from her position at G4S in Belgium for violating the G4S employee code of
conduct when she announced her firm intention to wear the Islamic headscarf at
work for religious reasons.6 In response to her termination, on April 26, 2007,
Ms. Achbita brought an action for damages for wrongful dismissal against G4S
before the Arbeidsrechtbank te Antwerpen (Antwerp Labour Court) in Antwerp,
Belgium. The Labour Court dismissed the action brought by Ms. Achbita on the
ground that no direct or indirect discrimination was present. Ms. Achbita
appealed to the Arbeidshof te Antwerpen (Antwerp Higher Labour Court) which
also dismissed her claims on December 23, 2011, on the grounds that, “in the
light of the lack of consensus in case-law and legal literature, G4S was under no
obligation to assume that its internal ban was illegal, and that Ms. Achbita’s
dismissal could not therefore be regarded as manifestly unreasonable or
discriminatory.”7 The case was further appealed to the Belgian Hof van Cassatie
(Court of Cassation, Belgium) which requested a preliminary ruling from the
ECJ on whether Article 2(2)(a) of Council Directive 2000/78 of 27 November
20008 (which establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment
and occupation) should be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition on
wearing a headscarf by a female Muslim at the workplace does not constitute
direct discrimination where the employer’s rule prohibits all employees from
wearing outward signs of political, philosophical, and religious beliefs at the
workplace.9
On March 14, 2017, the ECJ issued its response ruling in Achbita v. G4S
and determined that there is no direct discrimination present in G4S’s code of
4

Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2.

5

Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 16.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WEARING THE HEADSCARF IN THE WORKPLACE—OBSERVATIONS ON
DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RELIGION IN THE ACHBITA AND BOUGNAOUI CASES (2016),
http://perma.cc/W7C8-3UK9.

6

7

Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 20 (summarizing the Belgian appellate
court’s holding).

8

Council Directive 2000/78 of 27 November 2000, Establishing a General Framework for Equal
Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 18 (EC).

9

Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 22 (detailing the Court of Cassation’s
referred legal question).
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conduct since the ban “does not introduce a difference of treatment that is
directly based on religion or belief.”10 The court concluded that although Ms.
Achbita’s termination does not constitute direct discrimination as defined in
Directive 2000/78, it was still possible that the company’s policy indirectly
discriminates if “an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put
persons having a particular religion or belief . . . at a particular disadvantage
compared with other persons.”11 The court further noted that, consistent with
Directive 2000/78, indirect discrimination is permissible so long as the policy
that results in such indirect discrimination is “objectively justified by a legitimate
aim” and the means of achieving that aim are “appropriate and necessary.”12
The ECJ’s legal holding and the AG’s analysis of direct and indirect
discrimination under Directive 2000/78 serve as the focus of this Comment.
Directive 2000/78 is a current body of E.U. law that traces its roots and inherent
authority to Article 13 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(E.C. Treaty).13 In turn, the E.C. Treaty itself, which applies only to E.U.
member states,14 is generally consistent with other established bodies of
international law concerning the freedom of religious expression. These
established bodies of international law naturally apply more broadly than the
E.C. Treaty by encompassing states and countries outside of the E.U. The
primary bodies of relevant international law, all of which will be discussed more
thoroughly later in the Comment, include Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,15 Article 18 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,16 the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,17 and the

10

Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2, at ¶ 32.

11

Id. at ¶ 5.
Id. at ¶ 44.

12
13

Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006
O.J. (C 321) 37 [hereinafter E.C. Treaty].

14

Id. at art. 1 (“By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European
Union, hereinafter called ‘the Union’ . . . The Union shall be founded on the European
Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty.
Its task shall be to organise, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations
between the Member States and between their peoples.”).
G.A. Res. 217 III (A), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).

15
16

G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18 (Dec. 16,
1966).

17

G.A. Res. 36/55, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Nov. 25, 1981).
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European Convention on Human Rights18 (formerly known as the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).19 The
transition from broad and generalized international law, to the E.C. Treaty, and
then to Directive 2000/78, is accompanied by an increasingly more granular and
nuanced framework for interpreting whether religious discrimination is present
in a given context. The ECJ has now arrived at an interpretation of E.U. law that
may be inconsistent with broader international law predecessors and
counterparts.
On the other hand, perhaps the ECJ is indeed properly interpreting E.U.
law, yet E.U. law itself has become inconsistent with the established protections
of religious freedom firmly embedded within international law. For example,
whereas Directive 2000/78 distinguishes between “direct” and “indirect”
discrimination and provides for legal exceptions in the latter,20 the Declaration
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief (DEAFID) contains no such distinction.21 Specifically, Article
2(1) of the DEAFID states: “[n]o one shall be subject to discrimination by any
State, institution, group of persons, or person on grounds of religion or other
belief.”22 Article 2(2) goes on to clarify that:
For the purposes of the present Declaration, the expression “intolerance
and discrimination based on religion or belief” means any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as
its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an
equal basis.23

Note how the language of the DEAFID implies an outright ban on
discrimination regardless of whether the policy at issue has “as its purpose,”

18

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221.

19

As a point of clarity, the E.U. currently has 28 member states (see European Union, CITIZENS
INFORMATION, http://perma.cc/CTE8-EPPE). Thus, the E.C. Treaty applies only to these 28
member states. The European Convention on Human Rights, on the other hand, applies to the
entire Council of Europe, which contains a total of 47 countries, 28 of which are also members of
the E.U. (see Member States of the European Union and the Council of Europe, EUROPE IN STRASBOURG,
http://perma.cc/TL8M-H8AR). Broader still, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are products of the United Nations and
apply to all U.N. members. There are presently 193 Member States of the U.N. (see Growth in
United Nations Membership, UNITED NATIONS, http://perma.cc/YNE2-2LEX).
See Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 8, at art. 2(2)(a)–(b).

20
21

Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, supra note 17.

22

Id. at art. 2(1).
Id. at art. 2(2) (emphasis added).

23
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what Directive 2000/78 would categorize as “direct discrimination,”24 or “as its
effect,” which Directive 2000/78 labels “indirect discrimination.”25 Similarly,
Article 4 of the DEAFID requires: “[a]ll States shall take effective measures to
prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in the
recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in all fields of civil, economic, political, social, and cultural life.”26 Without
subcategorizing different types of discrimination, a plausible interpretation of
the DEAFID is that states have a legal duty to combat any discrimination based
on religion or belief. This creates an apparent tension between how Directive
2000/78 allows for legal exceptions to certain policies that result in indirect
discrimination, whereas no such exemptions can be found explicitly within the
DEAFID.27 As will be illustrated later in the Comment, similar tensions exist
between Directive 2000/78 and other bodies of international law.
This Comment seeks to analyze this potential discrepancy by first
providing a detailed discussion of the ECJ’s ruling and the AG’s legal analysis in
Achbita v. G4S.28 Section II illustrates the facts surrounding Ms. Achbita’s
termination, her circumstance as a devout Muslim woman, and G4S’s
employment policy that bans the wearing of religious symbols and attire in the
workplace. Additionally, this Section explores the effects of such a policy on
individuals similarly situated to Ms. Achbita. Section III of this Comment then
provides a brief history and overview of E.U. law concerning the freedom of
religious expression, including Directive 2000/78 and its origin in the E.C.
Treaty. This Section further analyzes the specifics of Ms. Achbita’s situation and
whether the ECJ’s ruling effectively protects an individual’s right to freely
express and exercise his or her religious beliefs. Section III also introduces the
major bodies of international law concerning religious freedom and expression
and provides a brief history and relevant summary of each. Finally, this Section
analyzes the interplay between E.U. law and international law. Specifically, it
discusses the idea that the ECJ ruling and E.U. law may not be effectively
protecting Ms. Achbita’s freedom of religious expression as prescribed by
existing international law. Section IV looks at how international law has been
applied in this regard and provides additional discussion regarding the
disconnect between E.U. and international law. Section IV additionally discusses
potential concerns, issues, and the implications created by this dissonance.
24
25

Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 8, at art. 2(2)(a).
Id. at art. 2(2)(b).

26

Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, supra note 17, at art. 4.

27

Id.
Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2; Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3.

28
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Section V concludes by offering additional solutions for interpreting both E.U.
and international law that maximize protection for the freedom of religious
expression.
The primary argument is that E.U. religious discrimination law is currently
ineffective in protecting the right of religious expression for followers of certain
religions. Religions with certain idiosyncratic practices do not receive sufficient
legal protection from religious discrimination. This is seen in the context of the
ECJ upholding a facially neutral employment policy that forces a devout Muslim
woman to violate a strict mandate of her religion if she wishes to retain her
employment.29 By contrast, the effect of such a policy on secular individuals or
those who follow religions without such strict mandates on religious apparel is
essentially de minimis. For instance, unlike for Muslim women, there is no
universal mandate on clothing that must be worn in public for women of many
Christian faiths. In its current form, E.U. law treats these inherently unequal
requirements as equals. Overall, this Comment raises specific concerns regarding
the ECJ’s holding and the AG’s analysis of E.U. law and how this relates to an
individual’s ability to freely practice his or her religion.30

II. M S . A CHBITA ’ S T ER MINATION AND THE E UROPEAN C OURT
OF J USTICE ’ S R ULIN G
Samira Achbita was hired as a receptionist at G4S Secure Solutions NV in
February of 2003.31 Ms. Achbita worked for G4S for three years until April
2006, at which point she announced that, going forward, she intended to wear a
headscarf during working hours in accordance with her Islamic faith.32 Prior to
this announcement, Ms. Achbita had worn the headscarf exclusively outside of
working hours for more than three years.33 On June 12, 2006, on account of her
firm intention to wear the Islamic headscarf in the workplace, Ms. Achbita was
29
30

31
32
33

Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2.
As a point of clarification, the ECJ’s Judgment of the Court contains a recitation of the relevant
law, a very brief analysis, and then states its legal ruling. This constitutes the official legal
determination by the court. By contrast, the Opinion of the AG, although not itself the official
holding of the ECJ, provides a detailed and thorough legal analysis of the issues raised. The
Opinion of the AG was directly relied on by the ECJ in reaching its ruling, and the ECJ adopted
virtually every legal conclusion reached by the AG. As such, this Comment often focuses on the
legal analysis by the AG, especially when the ECJ’s legal reasoning is unclear or underdeveloped
as presented in the Judgment of the Court. Any disparities between the Opinion of the AG and
the ECJ’s official Judgment of the Court, or any position expounded by the AG that was not
officially adopted by the ECJ, will be duly noted.
Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 16.
Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2, at ¶ 12.
Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 18.
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dismissed from her position at G4S.34 One day later, on June 13, 2006, a new
G4S employment policy took effect reading in pertinent part: “employees are
prohibited, in the workplace, from wearing any visible signs of their political,
philosophical or religious beliefs and/or from giving expression to any ritual
arising from them.”35
Once Ms. Achbita’s case reached the Belgium Court of Cassation, on
March 9, 2015, the court stayed proceedings and sought a preliminary ruling by
the ECJ on whether Article 2(2)(a) of Council Directive 2000/78 of 27
November 2000 should “be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition on
wearing, as a female Muslim, a headscarf at the workplace does not constitute
direct discrimination where the employer’s rule prohibits all employees from
wearing outward signs of political, philosophical and religious beliefs at the
workplace.”36 However, the ECJ and the AG went beyond the question
presented. The ECJ noted that under Directive 2000/78 discrimination is
subdivided into two categories: direct discrimination and indirect
discrimination.37 As will be analyzed more fully in the next Section, direct
discrimination occurs under Directive 2000/78 when “one person is treated less
favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable
situation.”38 The ECJ determined that since G4S’s policy applies with equal force
to all employees, there is a lack of evidence to support a determination of direct
discrimination.39 The AG specifically took pains to note that “[t]here is nothing
in the present case to indicate that [Ms. Achbita] was ‘treated less favourably.’”40
In addition, the AG explained, “there is no evidence here either of
discrimination perpetrated against the members of one religious community as
compared with the followers of other religions, or of discrimination perpetrated
against religious individuals as compared with non-religious individuals or
professed atheists.”41
However, after determining that G4S’s policy did not rise to the level of
direct discrimination, the ECJ proceeded to consider whether the company policy
constituted indirect discrimination within the meaning of Directive 2000/78. 42
34
35

36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id.
Claire Best, Muslim Headscarf Ban Justified by Employer's Dress Code Policy, LEXOLOGY (June 10, 2016),
¶ 4, http://perma.cc/5QHR-RY3U.
Achbita v. G4S, supra note 22, at ¶ 21.
Id. at ¶ 24.
Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 8, at art. 2(2)(a).
Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2, at ¶ 31–32.
Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 48.
Id.
Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2, at ¶ 34.
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Indirect discrimination is covered in Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78, which
specifies that: “indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a
particular religion or belief . . . at a particular disadvantage compared with other
persons.”43 The court further explained that even if these parameters are met,
there are certain situations under which a company policy that seemingly results
in indirect discrimination is nonetheless legally allowable.44 These situations
require that the “provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a
legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and
necessary.”45 If these conditions are satisfied, “a difference of treatment does not
. . . amount to indirect discrimination within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b).”46
Unfortunately, the concepts of “legitimate aim” and “appropriate and
necessary” are not explicitly defined under Directive 2000/78.47 Further, the ECJ
did not explore the meaning of these concepts in its ruling, simply stating that
such determinations are “for the referring court to ascertain.”48 However, the
AG looked to Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/78, which establishes basic
guidelines for determining when a policy that results in a difference of treatment
is acceptable.49 Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/78 sets two conditions a policy
such as G4S’s must meet: first, there must be a “genuine and determining
occupational requirement”; and, second, that requirement must be a
“proportionate” one which was laid down in pursuit of a “legitimate”
objective.50 Although the AG’s analysis of “genuine and determining
occupational requirement” is brief, it mentions that both the operational
processes involved by virtue of the employee’s role and the context in which
those processes are carried out are relevant considerations. As applied to Ms.
Achbita’s role as a receptionist, the AG explained that although the work of a
receptionist can be performed just as well with a headscarf as without one, a
company is entitled to legitimately decide on a policy of strict religious and
ideological neutrality in order to achieve a specific company image.51 This
conclusion was ultimately adopted by the ECJ holding: “the desire to display, in
relations with both public and private sector customers, a policy of political,
43

Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 8, at art. 2(2)(b).

44

Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2, at ¶ 35.
Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 8, at art. 2(2)(b)(i).

45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2, at ¶ 35.
Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 8.
Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2, at ¶ 44.
Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 8, at art. 4(1).
Id.
Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 76.
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philosophical or religious neutrality must be considered legitimate.”52 As such, a
facially neutral dress code, as an occupational requirement, to promote an image
of religious and ideological neutrality might pass muster.
The AG then turned her attention to clarifying what type of underlying
intention or purpose qualifies as a “legitimate aim.” In a rather unsatisfying way,
she attempts to define the bounds of a “legitimate aim” by appealing to the
norms and fundamental values of the E.U.53 The AG ultimately determines that
a “policy of neutrality [for G4S] is absolutely crucial” noting how the work is
characterized by constant face-to-face contact with external individuals, which
has a defining impact on the company’s image and affects the public’s
perception of the company’s customers.54 Again, this is a conclusion ultimately
adopted by the ECJ, explaining: “[a]n employer’s wish to project an image of
neutrality towards customers relates to the freedom to conduct a business …
and is, in principle, legitimate, notably where the employer involves in its pursuit
of that aim only those workers who are required to come into contact with the
employer’s customers.”55
However, this conclusion is in direct tension with the AG’s comments just
a few sentences earlier in the opinion where she explains that it would
“obviously not” constitute a legitimate aim for a company policy that accedes to
customers’ demands to be served only by employees of a particular religion.56
Curiously, the AG fails to address the critical concern that certain individuals are
required by their religion to wear certain clothing. Furthermore, the headscarf is
a garment that does not interfere with the occupational processes to be carried
out by the employee in filling her occupational role. In essence, a policy
grounded in presenting a certain company image, at least in the context of
banning otherwise mandatory religious apparel, is really nothing other than the
company implicitly acceding to customers’ demands to be served only by
individuals who follow certain religions. A company specifically crafts an image
for itself that it believes will be pleasing to customers, and a policy such as G4S’s
assumes that it is displeasing to customers to see a Muslim woman wearing a
religious headscarf—despite her religion requiring it. Thus, the AG seems to rely
on the same example in defining both what is and what is not a “legitimate
aim.”57 Arguably, defining “legitimate aim” is this manner seems to allow a
company policy that, in consequence, allows customers to demand to be served
52
53
54
55
56
57

Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2, at ¶ 37.
Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 87.
Id. at ¶ 94.
Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2, at ¶ 38.
Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 91.
Id.
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by anyone except devout, practicing Muslim women. Such implications extend
beyond just Muslim women, of course, but also to any follower of a religion
with clothing mandates that apply to public appearances.
Ultimately, the AG proposed a proportionality test that analyzed whether
the means to achieve a given legitimate aim are appropriate and necessary. The
AG set a rather low bar for what amounts to an “appropriate” measure,
essentially asking whether the means result in, or seek to achieve, the desired
ends.58 For G4S, a desired company policy of image neutrality would certainly be
achieved by a blanket ban on the wearing of religious apparel. As such, the AG
spent little time discussing this factor. However, a question of greater
importance is whether the particular means relied on are “necessary” in order to
achieve the company’s legitimate aim. Key to this factor, the AG noted, is
whether the same legitimate aim can be achieved by “means more lenient than a
ban” on the wearing of religious apparel.59 Although the AG provides limited
examples that would constitute less restrictive alternatives, such as providing a
company uniform that comes with an optional headscarf or assigning employees
who desire to wear certain religious apparel to back-office positions, the AG
noted that such solutions are not satisfactory because they would cut against her
previous analysis of a “legitimate aim.”60 Namely, these considered alternatives
do not allow a company to uphold its stated aim of religious and ideological
neutrality. As such, assuming the company’s policy meets the requirements for
being a legitimate aim, a facially neutral ban on the wearing of religious apparel
in the workplace satisfies the requirements for being both appropriate and
necessary. In sum, the foundation of the proportionality test analyzes whether
the means utilized to achieve a given legitimate aim are the least burdensome
available. If the means result in, or seek to achieve, the desired ends then such
means are appropriate. If the means are the least burdensome available that will
achieve the desired end, then they are necessary. If the means are both
appropriate and necessary, then they are proportional within the meaning of
Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/78.61 Recall that, under Directive 2000/78, a
policy that is indirectly discriminatory is nonetheless legally allowable so long as
that policy “is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.”62

58

Id. at ¶ 103.

59

Id. at ¶ 104.
Id. at ¶ 107.

60
61
62

Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 8, at art. 4(1).
Id. at art. 2(2)(b)(i).
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Yet the AG then inserted an additional factor into the proportionality test
that the court labeled “proportionality sensu stricto,”63 which balances whether the
disadvantages suffered by the adversely affected employee(s) are
disproportionate to the objective, or legitimate aim, pursued by the company’s
policy. As applied to Ms. Achbita, “this means that a fair balance must be struck
between the conflicting interests of employees such as Ms Achbita, on the one
hand, and undertakings of employers such as G4S, on the other.”64 The AG
identified various factors to consider when balancing the interests of the
employee with that of the employer including: how visible and conspicuous the
elements—such as religious symbols or apparel—in question are in relation to
the overall appearance of the employee; whether the employee operates in a
prominent role or a position of authority and/or the degree to which that
employee interfaces with the company’s clients; whether the policy merely asks
for restraint on religious expression as opposed to the forced adoption of a
particular religious belief or form of expression; whether differences of
treatment on other grounds are also presented by the implementation of the
particular policy, such as a policy that results in disparate impact on not only
those of certain religious backgrounds but also sex, color, or ethnic background
for example; and finally, the broader context surrounding any conflict between
an employee and the employer in connection with the wearing of visible
religious symbols in the workplace.65 Although the AG did not specifically
explain the meaning of the “broader context” factor, presumably this factor is
meant to gauge whether the employee has a genuine interest in wearing the
religious apparel or whether the employee merely attempts to exercise such an
interest for the sake of causing grief or difficulty for the employer.
The AG also briefly mentioned that the national identity of the E.U.
Member State should be considered in the proportionality calculus. She asserted
that in Member States where secularism has constitutional status and therefore
plays an instrumental role in social cohesion, the wearing of visible religious
symbols may legitimately be subject to stricter restrictions than in other Member
States that do not carry such sociopolitical positions.66 The AG, however, did
not explain the reasoning or value behind such a relativistic position. It seems an
odd proposition that E.U. law should apply differently to different E.U. Member
States. To the contrary, an argument could be made for the cohesive value,
intrinsic fairness, and efficiency of a proportionality standard that applies equally
63

64
65
66

See sensu stricto, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018), http://perma.cc/DL7E-52PV (defined
as “in a narrow or strict sense”).
Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 112.
Id. at ¶ 117–22.
Id. at ¶ 125.
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across all Member States bound by the same E.U. law. Nevertheless, the AG
arrived at the position that the national identity of the Member State involved is
a relevant factor to consider.
Unfortunately, the ECJ said little concerning weighing the interests of the
employer and employee in this context, and it is unclear to what extent it
adopted the AG’s “proportionality” regime. In its official ruling the ECJ simply
notes that: “the means of achieving [a legitimate] aim [must be] appropriate and
necessary.”67 Concerning what is “appropriate,” the ECJ explained that “it must
be held that the fact that workers are prohibited from visibly wearing signs of
political, philosophical or religious beliefs is appropriate for the purpose of
ensuring that a policy of neutrality is properly applied, provided that that policy
is genuinely pursued in a consistent and systematic manner.”68 As to whether the
policy is necessary, the court held that “it must be determined whether the
prohibition is limited to what is strictly necessary.”69 Interestingly, the ECJ’s
reasoning at this point diverged from the AG’s. Whereas the AG considered
alternatives to a blanket ban, such as relocating employees seeking to wear
religious apparel to back-office positions, as inconsistent with the notion of a
“legitimate aim,” the ECJ by contrast specifically suggests that only a ban
covering customer-facing employees might be strictly necessary.70 The ECJ
further explained that the referring court would have to consider whether “it
would have been possible for G4S, faced with [Ms. Achbita’s] refusal, to offer
her a post not involving any visual contact with those customers, instead of
dismissing her.”71 In addition, “[i]t is for the referring court . . . to take into
account the interests involved in the case and to limit the restrictions on the
freedoms concerned to what is strictly necessary.”72
In the end, the ECJ did not arrive at a firm conclusion as to whether G4S’s
employee policy banning the wearing of religious symbols in the workplace fails
the test for indirect discrimination. Even the AG provided merely a soft
conclusion in her opinion, stating: “there is much to support the argument that a
ban such as that at issue here does not unduly prejudice the legitimate interests
of the employees concerned and must therefore be regarded as proportionate.”73
Recall that the ECJ determined that G4S’s policy was not directly discriminatory,
and that Ms. Achbita’s suit would prevail only if she could establish that the
67

Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2, at ¶ 44.
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Id. at ¶ 40.
Id. at ¶ 42 (emphasis added).
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Id.
Id. at ¶ 43.
Id.
Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 126.
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policy was indirectly discriminatory. Further, any discriminatory effects resulting
from that policy could not be outweighed by a legitimate company aim and
whereby the means of achieving that aim were appropriate and necessary. The
Court had determined that religious and ideological neutrality is a legitimate aim,
that an outright ban might, or might not, be appropriate for achieving this
legitimate aim, and that the question of necessity must be analyzed through the
lens of what is strictly necessary.74 The AG resolved that these issues would have
to be decided by the referring court, which must “strike a fair balance between
the conflicting interests, taking into account all the relevant circumstances of the
case.”75 Thus, whether G4S’s policy implementing a blanket ban on the wearing
of religious apparel was strictly necessary, as well as some degree of a balancing
of interests, serve as the linchpins to the entire issue, at least as it relates to Ms.
Achbita’s situation.
Although a handful of both the AG’s and ECJ’s premises may be
debatable, there is no denying that both provided a fair and reasoned
interpretation of Directive 2000/78 and how it should apply. Yet the concern is
whether such a detailed level of scrutiny in applying Directive 2000/78 comports
with other established E.U. law, as well as broader international law concerning
the freedom of religious expression. The next Section begins this analysis by
taking a deeper look at Directive 2000/78, which finds its authority in Article 13
of the E.C. Treaty.

III. L EGAL D YNAMICS A ND THE F REEDOM OF R ELIGIOUS
E XPRESSION
A. European Union Law
The original Treaty Establishing the European Community was signed into
effect on March 25, 1957.76 The original treaty, however, did not contain any
special provisions for the protection of religious expression. In 1997, the Treaty
of Amsterdam77 amended the EC Treaty by adding Article 13 which states:
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the
limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council,
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after

74

Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2, at ¶ 42.
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Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 127.
E.C. Treaty, supra note 13.
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Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1. The Treaty
of Amsterdam had the additional effect of renumbering various articles of the amended EC
Treaty. Thus, Article 13 is the equivalent of Article 6(a) post-renumbering.
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consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age or sexual orientation.78

Based on the inherent authority provided by Article 13, in 2000 the E.U.
adopted Directive 2000/78, the so-called “Framework Directive,” which has the
purpose of establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment
and occupation.79 The Framework Directive “prohibits both direct and indirect
discrimination, harassment and an instruction to discriminate.”80
Article 1 establishes the general purpose of Directive 2000/78.81 Here,
Article 1 provides that Directive 2000/78 seeks to “lay down a general
framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or
belief . . . as regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into
effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment.”82 Article 2(1)
defines the “principle of equal treatment” in terms of “no direct or indirect
discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1.”83
These dual concepts of “direct” and “indirect” discrimination serve as the basis
for the Framework Directive which the ECJ relied on in testing whether
discrimination was present in the G4S employee policy. Direct discrimination is
handled entirely under Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78 which establishes:
“direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less
favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable
situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1.”84 As such, the ECJ’s
analysis for direct discrimination as applied to Ms. Achbita’s circumstances
perfectly aligns with the clear language of Article 2(2)(a).85 The G4S employee
policy applied equally to all individuals regardless of religious belief or affiliation.
In general, a policy that applies equally to all employees cannot treat one person
less favorably than another.
Although not raised by the court, one particular concern would include a
scenario whereby an employer implements a facially neutral employee policy
specifically to respond to the conduct or circumstances of a specific individual

78
79
80

81
82
83
84
85

Id. at art. 13.
Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 8.
Susanne D. Burri & Filip Dorssemont, The Transposition of the Race Directive (2000/43) and the
Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment (2000/78) into Dutch and Belgian Law, 21 INT'L
J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 537, 538 (2005).
Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 8, at art. 1.
Id.
Id. at art. 2(1).
Id. at art. 2(2)(a).
Id.
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that the employer views as problematic. For example, an employer may institute
a policy that bans the wearing of religious apparel in the workplace with the sole
intention of discouraging Muslim women from working at or applying to the
company. Despite the policy being facially neutral, the intent in enacting such a
policy would be an implicit form of targeted discrimination. In fact, there is
strong evidence in Ms. Achbita’s case that that is precisely what G4S aimed to
do with its policy banning the wearing of religious apparel in the workplace. Ms.
Achbita was fired on June 12, 2006. It wasn’t until the next day that G4S
officially established its employee policy on the books.86 It seems that Ms.
Achbita was the first employee to be disciplined by G4S for wearing religious
attire in the workplace. Yet note that the problematic conduct in the eyes of the
employer was that Ms. Achbita was a Muslim woman who sought to adhere
more strictly to the tenets of her religion. G4S’s policy, although seemingly
neutral, can certainly be framed as the company’s attempt to prevent devout
Muslim women from exercising their religious beliefs in the workplace. An
alternative explanation is that G4S felt for the first time the need to enshrine an
already existing, but perhaps unwritten, company policy in response to the
tension with Ms. Achbita’s religious practices. Still, despite speculation
concerning G4S’s motive in enacting the policy, the point is that if a facially
neutral policy is merely pretextual, a policy such as G4S’s could be directly
targeting and adversely affecting specific persons under the guise of equal
treatment.
The plain text of Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78 seems well-equipped
to handle hypothetical situations such as those above. Although the court did
not specifically address situations where a facially neutral policy was merely a
pretext meant to covertly accomplish targeted discrimination, Article 2(2)(a)’s
method of defining direct discrimination in terms of unequal treatment suggests
a means for combatting such techniques. In theory, one could compile enough
circumstantial evidence to show that a specific policy was created and enforced
with the intent to adversely affect one particular person or group of persons. If
one could show that a facially neutral employee policy was implemented solely
to harm one individual, this would presumably establish that the targeted person
is being treated less favorably than another. In other words, if an individual
could show that a neutral policy was implemented with the intent of harming
certain individuals, then that policy would violate the principle of equal
treatment within the meaning of Directive 2000/78. Unfortunately, the ECJ did
not explore this possibility.
The other test intrinsic to Directive 2000/78’s Framework Directive is
whether the employee policy indirectly discriminates against a specific person or
86

See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 6.
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group. Article 2(2)(b) establishes that “indirect discrimination shall be taken to
occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put
persons having a particular religion or belief . . . at a particular disadvantage
compared with other persons.”87 Unlike Article 2(2)(a) for direct discrimination,
however, Article 2(2)(b) is accompanied by the important caveat that it does not
constitute indirect discrimination if “[the] provision, criterion or practice is
objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are
appropriate and necessary.”88 Unfortunately, Article (2)(2)(b) lacks any real
guidance for determining whether a policy constitutes indirect discrimination. It
is unclear precisely what is a legitimate aim or what is meant by means that are
appropriate and necessary.89 These concepts were not defined under Directive
2000/78 and thus resulted in the ECJ being tasked with formulating a
methodology for balancing the interests of the employee in religious expression
in the workplace and the interests of the company.
The ECJ has previously grappled with the concept of indirect
discrimination in the context of a facially neutral policy. For example, in Ursula
Voß v. Land Berlin,90 a gender pay discrepancy case, the Advocate General stated:
“[t]here is also indirect discrimination where, for example, a regulation is
adopted which, although formulated in a neutral way, in fact adversely affects a
far larger proportion of women than men, except if it is justified by objective
reasons which are wholly unrelated to any discrimination based on sex.” 91
Similarly, in Kirsammer-Hack v. Sidal,92 another gender discrimination case, the
court explained: “[t]he Court has consistently held that national rules
discriminate indirectly against women where, although worded in neutral terms,
they are more disadvantageous to women than men, unless that difference in
treatment is justified by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on
grounds of sex.”93 Although these case examples concern gender discrimination,
the ECJ implemented a similar construct in analyzing whether a facially neutral
employment policy indirectly discriminates on the basis of religion. Per the
court:
87
88
89
90

91
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Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 8, at art. 2(2)(b).
Id. at art. 2(2)(b)(i).
Id.
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 6 December 2007, Ursula Voß v. Land Berlin, C300/06, EU:C:2007:757.
Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer of 10 July 2007, Ursula Voß v. Land Berlin,
C-300/06, EU:C:2007:424, I-10587, at para. 48.
Judgment of the Court of 30 November 1993, Kirsammer-Hack v. Sidal, C-189/91,
EU:C:1993:907, at ¶ 22.
Id.
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an internal rule of a private undertaking may constitute indirect
discrimination within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) . . . if it is established
that the apparently neutral obligation it imposes results, in fact, in persons
adhering to a particular religion or belief being put at a particular
disadvantage, unless it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, such as the
pursuit by the employer, in its relations with its customers, of a policy of
political, philosophical and religious neutrality.94

Thus, an employer’s legitimate desire to present an image of ideological
neutrality to its customers serves as an objective factor that is both unrelated to
the resulting discrimination based on religion and legally justifies that particular
employment policy.
At this point it seems clear that the AG and the ECJ effectively applied
Directive 2000/78, formulated an appropriate balancing test, and established a
reliable framework on which future cases can rely for guidance. Yet despite this
being the right outcome based on the effective application of Directive 2000/78,
it is less clear whether this is a proper outcome as envisioned by Article 13 of the
E.C. Treaty. There is an unsettling disconnect between Article 13’s broad
language, which grants the authority to take appropriate action to combat
discrimination, and the focused scrutiny supplied by Directive 2000/78 coupled
with the ECJ’s balancing of relevant interests. Taken at face value, “appropriate
action to combat discrimination” evinces a purpose to stamp out discrimination
should it manifest.95 This interpretation suggests that, under Article 13, the
simple test is whether the company policy discriminates on the basis of religion.
If so, there is legal authorization to combat such a policy.
This gap between the language of Article 13, which seeks to outright
combat discrimination, and the application of Directive 2000/78, which leads to
an outcome where a policy that results in discrimination against Muslim women
can be justified and acceptable, is unsatisfactory. For one, no one can sensibly
deny that G4S’s facially neutral policy places a greater burden on those following
religions that have clothing mandates than it does on those whose religions do
not require specific clothing to be worn in a public setting. Muslim women with
strict clothing mandates are affected to a far greater degree by such a policy than
many Christian women, for example, who are not required by any religious
mandate to wear specific garb or attire in public. For context, the following is a
passage from the Qur’an detailing the clothing mandates for women who follow
Islam:
And tell the believing women to reduce [some] of their vision and guard
their private parts and not expose their adornment except that which
[necessarily] appears thereof and to wrap [a portion of] their headcovers
94
95

Achbita v. G4S, supra note 2, at ¶ 44.
E.C. Treaty, supra note 13, at art. 13.

Winter 2019

633

Chicago Journal of International Law

over their chests and not expose their adornment except to their husbands,
their fathers, their husbands' fathers, their sons, their husbands' sons, their
brothers, their brothers' sons, their sisters' sons, their women, that which
their right hands possess, or those male attendants having no physical
desire, or children who are not yet aware of the private aspects of women.
And let them not stamp their feet to make known what they conceal of their
adornment. And turn to Allah in repentance, all of you, O believers, that
you might succeed.96

The Qur’an, as commonly interpreted, teaches Muslim women that they
should wear headcovers and limit visible exposure of their physical features.
Should an individual wish to strictly follow this religious mandate, they, like Ms.
Achbita, would be ineligible to work at G4S due to employee policy barring the
wearing of religious symbols and attire. Note that such an individual becomes
ineligible for employment at G4S in this regard solely by virtue of her religion.
Therefore, even if such a policy does not qualify as legal discrimination under
Directive 2000/78, it certainly satisfies the dictionary definition of
discrimination.97 In essence, the functional effect of G4S’s employee policy,
despite being facially neutral, is this: secular individuals, atheists, and any who
follow a religion that does not mandate clothing requirements that apply in the
workplace may work here. Individuals, such as devout Muslim women, who
follow a religion that does contain such clothing mandates, may not. In this
regard, Muslim women similarly situated to Ms. Achbita are afforded fewer
opportunities by being ineligible to work at any company with an employee
policy similar to that at G4S. The alternative would be to abandon strict
adherence to one’s religion if doing so would once again make one eligible for
employment. The broad and simple language of Article 13 of the E.C. Treaty to
“combat discrimination” suggests that such literal discrimination falls within the
category of ills the E.C. Treaty seeks to encompass.
Nevertheless, even if one accepts an interpretation of Article 13 that would
result in a different ruling by the ECJ had it not been guided by the strict
requirements of Directive 2000/78, the language of Article 13 is permissive
rather obligatory: “the Council . . . may take appropriate action to combat
discrimination.”98 As a result, there is no direct conflict between Directive
2000/78 and Article 13 of the EC Treaty. Directive 2000/78 is simply a body of
law whose existence is authorized by Article 13. Instead, the tension between the
two seems to lie in the potential scope of conduct that qualifies as legal
96
97
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An-Nur, 24:31 (Qur’an).
See discrimination, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018), http://perma.cc/DLC5-MS88 (defined
as “prejudiced or prejudicial outlook, action, or treatment”); See also prejudicial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY (2018), http://perma.cc/4E99-2Q5A (defined as “tending to injure or impair:
detrimental”).
E.C. Treaty, supra note 13, at art. 13.
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discrimination. Although perhaps subtle in the narrow context of E.U.-specific
law, international law defines the scope of religious discrimination in a fashion
that arguably creates even greater dissonance with the approach for determining
discrimination under Directive 2000/78.
B. Broader International Law
Protecting the freedom of religious expression is a staple among the
various bodies of international law. In many ways, these various international
codes and treaties have firmly established the freedom to practice one’s religion
as a fundamental human right. Here the Comment introduces and briefly
summarizes the major bodies of law that not only overlap with E.U. law and
Directive 2000/78, but also relate directly to Ms. Achbita’s circumstance and the
G4S employee policy barring religious apparel in the workplace.
However, a preliminary note must be made at this juncture. The bodies of
international law to be discussed apply to state actors. However, there is some
debate in the scholarly arena as to whether, and to what extent, private citizens
can rely on the provisions of international treaties. For example, in the context
of U.S. law, Chief Justice Marshall invented the concept of a “self-executing”
treaty in 1829 when he asserted such a treaty “is carried into
execution . . . whenever it operates of itself.”99 This idea would be in contrast to
that of a “non-self-executing” treaty, namely a treaty that that “the legislature
must execute.”100 This distinction turns on the notion that “some treaties do not
operate of themselves but require domestic legislation to carry them ‘into
execution.’”101 In the U.S., historically, “courts generally applied a strong
presumption that private litigants could use treaties to press their claims in
court.”102 However, this presumption was turned on its head in Medellín v. Texas
when the Court adopted a “background presumption” against finding that
treaties confer private rights or private rights of action, even when they are selfexecuting.103 As a result, it is unclear to what extent a U.S. citizen can enforce the
fundamental rights found under international law without state assistance.
This similar complication arises in the context of E.U. law. The E.U. has a
basic obligation to comply with international law.104 However, the E.U. has
99
100
101
102
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Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
Id.
Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 767 (1988).
Oona A. Hathaway et al., International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, Y. J. INT’L L. 51,
53 (2012).
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008).
Francesca Martines, Direct Effect of International Agreements of the European Union, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L.
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traditionally rooted its human rights obligations within its own legal order.105
Under this approach, “the EU is merely under an obligation not to violate
human rights when it acts (i.e. a negative obligation to respect human rights).” 106
The conflict thus occurs in that “Member States remain bound by their
obligations under UN human rights treaties and cannot release themselves from
these obligations simply by delegating powers relevant to their implementation
to the EU.”107 Once again, there is a tension between the fundamental human
rights established by international law and the availability to exercise those rights
should the E.U. fail to proactively ensure such rights.
However, a detailed discussion of “self-executing” versus “non-selfexecuting treaties” is beyond the scope of this Comment. At a minimum, it is
accepted that G4S, as a private employer, is not bound by the provisions of the
following international law treaties. Additionally, this Comment does not openly
suggest that Ms. Achbita has a private right of action against either her employer
or the E.U. The stance this Comment takes is that the E.U., should it fail to
enact legislation to ensure the preservation of freedom of religious expression
for its Member States’ citizenry, is the party in violation of international law.
This bold assertion is not mere conjecture. As stated by the U.N.:
International human rights law lays down obligations which States are
bound to respect. By becoming parties to international treaties, States
assume obligations and duties under international law to respect, to protect
and to fulfil human rights. The obligation to respect means that States must
refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights.
The obligation to protect requires States to protect individuals and groups
against human rights abuses. The obligation to fulfil means that States must
take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights.108

As G4S is a private, nongovernmental employer, international law does not
directly apply to its conduct. Therefore, G4S’s employee policy does not itself
violate international law. Instead, this Comment takes the stance that a state has
a positive duty to enforce the provisions of the following international treaties
and resolutions to enshrine the fundamental rights established under these
bodies of international law. The freedom of religious expression is the relevant
fundamental right at issue. However, an analysis of whether E.U. law sufficiently
protects this fundamental right for a private citizen such as Ms. Achbita cannot
105
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be viewed in isolation. As noted by the AG, G4S has its own private interests
and a “policy of [ideological] neutrality does not exceed the bounds of the
discretion it enjoys in the pursuit of its business.”109 As such, any analysis as to
whether the E.U. is properly adhering to its international law obligations
necessarily entails keeping both Ms. Achbita’s and G4S’s interests at the
forefront of one’s thoughts. A second consideration is whether both private
interests can fairly be seen as “fundamental human rights.”
This Section of the Comment introduces the relevant bodies of
international law that apply beyond simply the member states of the E.U. The
purpose is to explore whether E.U. law and the approach taken by the AG and
the ECJ is consistent with the legal norms and dictates of the broader
international community.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights110 (UDHR) was proclaimed by
the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948 as “a
common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations.”111 The
UDHR contains multiple provisions establishing various fundamental rights and
freedoms including the rights to life, liberty, security, adequate standards of
living, and privacy. For this Comment’s purposes, Article 18 similarly establishes
the freedom of religious expression as a fundamental human right. Article 18
states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”112
Of important note is the plain language of Article 18 focusing on “freedom
. . . in community. . . and in public . . . to manifest his religion or belief in . . .
practice, worship, and observance.”113 Article 18 thus doesn’t only establish the
freedom to adhere to a particular religion or belief, but specifically preserves the
freedom to manifest that belief in practice in both private and public contexts. It
is unclear by the text of Article 18 whether such a right was intended to be
exercised on occasion, such as occasional worship in the public square, or
whether it applies with equal force to religious practices that are constant. For
example, Ms. Achbita’s position is that her religion dictates that she should wear

109
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the Islamic headscarf at all times that she is in public.114 One interpretation of
Article 18 is that this type of religious practice that constitutes a form of
constant religious observance is a fundamental human right. Yet this
interpretation does not fit with Directive 2000/78’s concept of balancing
interests between employer and employee. Whereas Article 18 states that Ms.
Achbita is entitled to wear the Islamic headscarf in public as a fundamental right,
Directive 2000/78 by contrast essentially states, “yes she can, but not at work
when the employer’s interest in religious neutrality is both a legitimate aim and
the means to achieve that aim are appropriate and necessary.” In this way,
Directive 2000/78 abridges a freedom of religious expression for individuals
such as Ms. Achbita for which Article 18 expressly provides.
An alternative interpretation of Article 18 is that freedom of religious
expression is not necessarily a universal freedom divorced from time, place, and
manner restrictions. So long as an individual is not ultimately barred from
practicing his or her religion at some times and in some places, then Article 18,
under this interpretation, would not be violated by a policy banning religious
apparel in the workplace. Ms. Achbita certainly has the right to be a Muslim
woman, to practice her religion, and to wear a headscarf in numerous other
contexts, both public and private, except for in the workplace per the ECJ’s
ruling. Furthermore, as the ECJ explained, this abridgement of freedom of
religious expression isn’t arbitrary, but rather an issue of two competing interests
butting up against one another. The employer has an interest in creating a
religiously and ideologically neutral image which conflicts with the employee’s
interest in manifesting her religious beliefs in the workplace. It would be odd to
think that Article 18 was meant to allow all religious practices, at all times, and in
all places to fall within its scope. Such an interpretation would clearly be
untenable, especially in situations where competing interests are at play.
However, a loose or malleable interpretation of Article 18 threatens to
remove any force the UDHR might have in terms of protecting religious
expression as a fundamental freedom. At a minimum, “[i]nvoking customary
human rights law is in itself not dispositive, though it may lend weight to an
existing right and affect the balancing process in a domestic legal issue which
deals with human rights.”115 As Adrienne Anderson notes, “[d]espite challenges
to the UDHR’s universal relevance and enforceability. . . it is commonly
perceived as the underpinning of international human rights and credited as the
inspiration of more than two hundred international human rights
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See Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3.
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Li-Ann Thio, Reading Rights Rightly: The UDHR and Its Creeping Influence on the Development of Singapore
Public Law, 2008 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 264, 284.
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instruments.”116 This fact alone suggests that although the UDHR is not a treaty
(it is a U.N. resolution), and thus does not directly create legal obligations for
countries,117 substantial weight should be given to the value it places on
fundamental freedoms, such as religious expression. As Anderson further notes,
“[t]he UDHR is held in such regard for its contribution to the international
human rights regime that the UDHR and human rights have become almost
synonymous concepts.”118 Anderson goes on to quote Professor Jack Donnelly,
who states: “For the purposes of international action, ‘human rights’ means
roughly ‘what is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’”119
The functional effect of allowing exceptions to the general rule of religious
freedom, especially for the many individuals who spend a great deal of their lives
in a work environment, would be to relegate freedom of religious expression to
a subordinate position in the spectrum of human interests. Religious expression
becomes ultimately a “do it on your own time” engagement. This is all the more
concerning considering that wearing the Islamic headscarf for many devout
traditional Muslim women is not optional—they are supposed to wear the
headscarf any time they are in any public place. Thus, without a strict
interpretation of Article 18, religions with these constant or universal
requirements are not protected relative to religions that do not have such
requirements. Essentially, Article 18 would allow a Catholic individual to adhere
to the tenets of her religion but would not allow a Muslim individual to adhere
to the tenets of her religion, simply because the Muslim individual must follow
public clothing mandates whereas the Catholic individual does not. Further
consider the ongoing commitments of many other religions, such as Jewish
individuals who require Kosher food, or Hindu individuals who abstain from
eating beef. Under this interpretation of Article 18, many widespread religious
practices would have little protection under the UDHR. This position,
understandably, would be unworkable if a particular religious practice created
undue burden, expense, or openly violated the rights of others, but this case
involves a particularly innocuous practice: the public wearing of a scarf on one’s
head. As even the ECJ noted, “the work of a receptionist can . . . be performed
just as well with a headscarf as without one.”120 Directive 2000/78 apparently
116

Adrienne Anderson, On Dignity and Whether the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Remains a Place
of Refuge after 60 Years, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 115, 118 (2009).
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See What is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?, AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION,
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Anderson, supra note 116, at 119.
Id. (quoting JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 22 (2d ed.
2003)).
Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 75.
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abridges, at least in some contexts, a freedom of religious expression guaranteed
by Article 18 of the UDHR.
2. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights121 (ICCPR) is an
international human rights treaty adopted by the U.N. in 1966.122 In many
respects, the ICCPR practically mirrors the protections afforded by Article 18 of
the UDHR. Article 18(1) of the ICCPR states:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.123

Article 18 of the ICCPR, however, adds two additional lenses not found in
the UDHR by which to analyze freedom of religious expression. Article 18(2)
provides that: “[n]o one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.”124 A narrow
reading of this provision would suggest that it applies only to coercive conduct
that prevents an individual from adopting their own desired religion. A more
relaxed interpretation suggests that this provision bars coercive conduct that
would dissuade an individual from adopting a particular belief or religious
practice, such as an adherence to clothing mandates. Commentators Katarzyna
Ważyńska-Finck and François Finck have explained that the Human Rights
Committee has found that Article 18 of the ICCPR “should be construed as
covering also the right to change one’s beliefs.”125 This interpretation suggests a
fluid, dynamic process by which an individual is at liberty to change or modify
his or her beliefs as desired. Ważyńska-Finck and Finck further argue that
“Article 18 guarantees everyone’s right ‘to have or to adopt a religion or belief of
his choice’, thus clearly stating the importance to respect the individual’s freedom
of choice in this matter.”126 This line of argumentation implies that Article 18(2)
extends beyond the narrow reading of simply barring the forcing of a religion on
another individual, but to also give deference to the individual’s choice of
whether to modify his or her belief(s) in either piecemeal or wholesale fashion.
121
122

123
124
125
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 16.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION,
http://perma.cc/HX52-89PA.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 16, at art. 18(1).
Id. at art. 18(2).
Katarzyna Ważyńska-Finck & François Finck, The Right to Change One's Religion According to Article
18 of ICCPR and the Universality of Human Rights, 9 J. ISLAMIC ST. PRAC. INT'L L. 36, 36 (2013).
Id. at 43.
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Logically, this would apply to a decision to follow a particular religious practice
as equally as it would to adopting an entire religion. In addition, Devin
Carpenter notes that “[d]uring the drafting of Article 18, there was significant
disagreement about the scope of the phrase “religion or belief,” but the evidence
suggests that it was understood to cover non-religious belief and its
manifestation.”127 This further indicates that a particular religious practice, and
its manifestation, fall within the scope of Article 18(2). Furthermore, the U.N.
Human Rights Committee has itself explained:
Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the
right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms “belief” and “religion”
are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to
traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional
characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The
Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate
against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are
newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be the subject
of hostility on the part of a predominant religious community.128

This provision of the ICCPR warrants particular consideration as applied
to the ECJ’s ruling and G4S’s employee policy. When a particular employment
policy conflicts with a religious mandate, an individual is faced with a choice
between adhering to his or her religious beliefs and maintaining employment.
Neither Directive 2000/78 nor the ECJ addresses whether G4S’s policy could be
seen as coercive in this manner. In one respect, G4S’s policy could be said to
coerce Muslim women into violating their religious beliefs in order to secure
employment. The pushback, of course, is that G4S is not the only employer and
such women are free to explore employment opportunities elsewhere. Yet,
consider the impact on Muslim women if the vast majority of employers
adopted a policy similar to that of G4S. If Directive 2000/78 allows for this state
of affairs to exist, it seems we have arrived at state-sanctioned coercion whereby
followers of religions that mandate certain garb in public must abandon their
religious beliefs to gain employment.
Ultimately, the ECJ does not pursue this line of thought. Perhaps the court
felt such considerations were beyond the scope of the immediate case, or
perhaps any concept of coercion was seen as merely an incidental effect of
G4S’s employee policy and that Ms. Achbita had ample opportunity to seek
alternative employment. In any event, the ICCPR’s bar against coercion per
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Devin Carpenter, Comment, “So Made That I Cannot Believe”: The ICCPR and the Protection of NonReligious Expression in Predominantly Religious Countries, 18 CHI. J. INT'L L. 216, 227 (2017).
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U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of
Thought, Conscience or Religion), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (Jul. 30, 1993).
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Article 18(2) is both a relevant and pressing concern for analyzing policies that
impact religious belief and expression.
The second distinctive feature of the ICCPR is that it narrows the scope of
freedom of religious expression relative to the unbounded provision of Article
18 under the UDHR. Article 18(3) states: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or
beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others.”129 Article 18(3), in essence, addresses many of
the previous concerns for interpreting the breadth of Article 18 of the UDHR.
As previously noted, it would be illogical to assume every conceivable religious
practice is allowable, especially when certain practices could cause substantial
harm to others or conflict with other persons’ rights. Yet unlike the
proportionality approach advanced by the ECJ relying on Directive 2000/78,
which carefully balances the interests of employer and employee, Article 18(3)
seemingly sets a higher bar for abridging freedom of religious expression. The
only justifiable limitations on the freedom of religion or belief per Article 18(3)
are those “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”130 In addition, “General Comment
No. 22 of [A]rticle 18(3) insists that the limitation or restriction on the
manifestation of religion should not be undertaken for discriminatory purposes
or be applied in a discriminatory manner.”131 Although the precise scope of
“fundamental rights and freedoms of others” is not clear, the UN Human Rights
Committee has clarified that:
In interpreting the scope of permissible limitation clauses, States parties
should proceed from the need to protect the rights guaranteed under the
Covenant, including the right to equality and non-discrimination on all
grounds specified in articles 2, 3 and 26. Limitations imposed must be
established by law and must not be applied in a manner that would vitiate
the rights guaranteed in article 18.132

Although the ECJ’s proportionality test included a “necessary and
appropriate” measure that sounds similar to Article 18(3) here, recall that this
test applies merely to the means needed to achieve a legitimate aim that had
already been established by the employer. “Legitimate aim” under Directive
2000/78 thus appears to be a much lower threshold than the “fundamental

129
130

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 16, at art. 18(3).
Id.
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Alfitri, Can the Requirements of Shariah Law Regarding Criminal Punishments Be Interpreted in a Way That
Is Compatible with the ICCPR and CAT?, 7 INDON. J. INT'L L. 103, 112 (2009).
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rights” language of Article 18(3).133 Further recall that the AG defined
“legitimate aim” by appealing to both the norms and “fundamental values” of
the E.U.134 There is arguably a key distinction between “fundamental values” and
“fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” Namely, just because something is
fundamentally valued, for example, a high-paying career, it does not mean that
one has an entitlement to that thing. That which is fundamentally valued often
requires effort to achieve; that which is a fundamental right is intrinsic and selffulfilling.135 The contrast is even starker when comparing norms to “fundamental
rights.” Throughout history, atrocities such as slavery and genital mutilation have
been social norms in many countries and cultures, yet clearly such norms do not
translate well into an objective valuation of fundamental human rights.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that Article 18(3) of the ICCPR sets a
strict condition that the freedom of religious expression can be abridged only in
extreme circumstances such as those “necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”136
Although one could argue an employer’s desire to present an ideologically
neutral image is a fundamental right alongside the freedom of religious
expression, recall the U.N. Human Rights Committee has clarified that, in
formulating any limitations on the freedom of religious expression, “States
parties should proceed from the need to protect the rights guaranteed under the
Covenant.”137 Freedom of religious expression is a right explicitly guaranteed
under the Covenant (ICCPR).138 The ability of an employer to manufacture a
specific public image for their place of business, by contrast, has no explicit
support under the ICCPR provisions. Thus, some distance below sits the
threshold for “legitimate aim” under Directive 2000/78, which allows for
freedom of religious expression to be abridged even without a showing of such
necessity or the encroachment upon a fundamental right. In fact, all that must be
shown per Directive 2000/78 to open the door for the suppression of religious
expression is a “legitimate aim.”

133
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Compare Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 8, and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 16, at art. 18(3).
Achbita v. G4S, Opinion of the AG, supra note 3, at ¶ 87.
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3. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.
The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief139 (DEAFID) was passed by the
U.N. General Assembly on November 25, 1981.140 Similar to the ICCPR, the
DEAFID sets a foundation for the observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms but sets a specific focus on the freedom of religious
belief and expression. Article 2(1) of the DEAFID states that: “[n]o one shall be
subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons, or person
on the grounds of religion or belief.”141 In addition, Article 2(2) further defines
actions that qualify as “intolerance and discrimination based on religion or
belief” as follows:
For the purposes of the present Declaration, the expression “intolerance
and discrimination based on religion or belief” means any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as
its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an
equal basis.142

Of critical importance in comparing this body of international law to E.U.
law is the way in which discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief is
defined. Directive 2000/78 differentiates between “direct” and “indirect”
discrimination and treats each type differently under separate provisions; the
DEAFID groups both restrictions that are “purposeful” and those that “[have]
as [their] effect” impairment on religious exercise into a single category of
“discrimination.”143 This approach which treats both direct and indirect
discrimination as simply “discrimination,” that is prohibited outright, appears to
be at odds with Directive 2000/78’s differential treatment of direct and indirect
discrimination. Presumably, without such differential treatment, G4S’s policy
would either “purposefully” restrict or “have as its effect” a restriction on
Muslim women’s ability to exercise their religious beliefs. Either way, the policy
would be discriminatory against individuals such as Ms. Achbita and not allowed
under international law. This presents yet another instance of E.U. law being
seemingly inconsistent with international law.

139

Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, supra note 17.
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Id.
Id. at art. 2(1).
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An additional analytical point, however, is that Article 2(2) specifically
defines discrimination as occurring when a restriction prevents “enjoyment or
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.”144 One
could argue that G4S’s policy does not violate Article 2 of the DEAFID because
the policy applies equally to all persons and every set of religious beliefs. This
produces an equal basis and is thus non-discriminatory.
The response argument is that, by its very nature, applying a uniform policy
to a range of unequal religious beliefs produces inequitable results. A policy such
as G4S’s thus favors, directly or indirectly, certain religions over others. As a
result of the company policy, a Muslim woman is not equally allowed to practice
her religious beliefs to the same degree of freedom as a follower of a religion
that has no public clothing requirements. It becomes a “square peg, round hole”
type of scenario when a multitude of different religions with vastly different
defining characteristics and religious mandates are expected to conform to a
standardized policy. This produces an unequal basis for exercise of religious
belief because certain religions are more heavily burdened than others. In effect,
individuals such as Ms. Achbita are discriminated against because G4S’s policy
impairs the enjoyment or exercise of their particular set of religious beliefs to a
greater extent than it does for followers of many other religions.
4. European Convention on Human Rights.
The European Convention on Human Rights145 (ECHR) is the first
Council of Europe’s convention.146 It was adopted in 1950 and entered into
force in 1953.147 Like many of the bodies of international law previously
discussed, the ECHR aims at protecting the right to life, freedom, and security;
freedom of expression, property, and peaceful enjoyment of possessions; and
also bans certain institutions such as the death penalty and slavery.148 Of course
the ECHR also protects the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Article
9(1) establishes that: “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”149
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Id. (emphasis added).
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Unsurprisingly, the language of Article 9(1) is virtually identical to the language
of Article 18 of the UDHR and Article 18 of the ICCPR.
Also similar to the ICCPR, the ECHR sets limits on the extent to which
such freedoms can be exercised. Article 9(2) states:
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.150

Note how similar this is to the language of the ICCPR at Article 18(3)
which allows restrictions on religious expression that are “necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others.”151 Due to the similarity in language between the ECHR, the UDHR, and
the ICCPR, there is nothing new to say here other than that the ECHR
represents yet another body of international law that, while cohesive with other
established bodies of international law, seems to be in tension with E.U. law,
namely Directive 2000/78, and its approach to determining the bounds of
religious expression.
At this point, it is necessary to briefly reiterate a point concerning the
scope of certain international law such as the ECHR. A reader familiar with the
ECHR might remark that the it is applicable only to the Member States. In this
regard, a private action must be brought against a state party when the
individual’s rights under the ECHR have been violated. Therefore, since a
company like G4S is a private employer, the terms of the ECHR do not apply
directly to G4S. Furthermore, since Ms. Achbita brought a private action against
her private employer, the ECHR seems inapplicable. While it is true that Ms.
Achbita could not rely on the law of the ECHR against her private employer, it
is important to note that Article 1 of the ECHR imposes an affirmative duty on
Member States (referred to as “High Contracting Parties”) to ensure the rights
and freedoms established in the ECHR for their citizens. Specifically, Article 1
states: “[o]bligation to respect Human Rights – The High Contracting Parties
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined
in Section I of this Convention.”152 Section I contains the remaining Articles
within the ECHR, including Article 9. In this regard, Ms. Achbita could
theoretically bring a secondary suit against Belgium for failing to ensure her
freedom of religious expression should Belgium fail to respond with state action
to bar employee policies such as G4S’s (assuming of course Ms. Achbita could
establish that G4S’s policy is indeed violative of her rights under Article 9 of the
150
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 16, at art. 18(3).
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, at art. 1.

152

646

Vol. 19 No. 2

Choose One: Employment or Religious Obedience

Simms

ECHR). Although a hypothetical secondary suit against Belgium is somewhat
beyond the scope of this paper, the main value in analyzing the ECHR similar to
other bodies of international law concerning religious expression is in
determining where the legal lines of permissible religious expression are to be
drawn, how truly “fundamental” is a right of religious expression in a legal sense,
and how Directive 2000/78 seems to be the outlier in terms of creating the
necessary distinctions.

IV. A PPLICATION OF I NTERNATIONAL L AW AND A NALYSIS
The discussion so far has focused on the specific language of various
bodies of both European and international law concerning the freedom of
religious expression. Historic applications of these bodies of law have yielded
similar results. For instance, concerning the ECHR, Jill Marshall points out that:
In all the cases, the Convention institutions have found that in a democratic
society, the relevant member state is entitled to ban adult women from
wearing the Islamic headscarf on the basis that such bans have been
prescribed by law, have a legitimate aim, that is, protecting the rights and
freedoms of others, and are necessary in a democratic society.153

A particular case Marshall focuses on is Sahin v. Turkey, where Ms. Sahin brought
a suit against the Republic of Turkey after she faced disciplinary action while
attending Istanbul University.154 Ms. Sahin had refused to comply with a newly
instituted university policy that banned students from attending lectures if the
student wore the Islamic headscarf or otherwise covered his or her head.155
Among other claims, Ms. Sahin alleged her rights had been violated under
Articles 8, 9, and 14 of the ECHR.156 Importantly, “[Ms. Sahin] comes from a
traditional family of practising Muslims and considers it her religious duty to
wear the Islamic headscarf.”157 The court concluded that although there had
been interference with Ms. Sahin’s rights under Article 9, such interference was
justified under Article 9(2) because the state’s principles of secularism and
equality must necessarily be upheld in order to protect the democratic system in

153
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Jill Marshall, Freedom of Religious Expression and Gender Equality: Sahin v. Turkey, 69 MOD. L. REV.
452, 453 (2006).
Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, ¶ 15–22.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Id. at ¶ 3. Article 8 of the ECHR deals with the right to respect for private and family life; Article
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Id. at ¶ 14.
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Turkey.158 Per the court: “An attitude which fails to respect that principle [of
secularism] will not necessarily be accepted as being covered by the freedom to
manifest one’s religion and will not enjoy the protection of Article 9 of the
Convention.”159
Similarly, in Karaduman v. Turkey, the court upheld a university policy
whereby graduating students were required to supply an identity photograph
containing no head coverings or headwraps in order to receive their degree
certificate.160 The applicant was a student who had recently completed her
university studies at the department of pharmacology in Ankara.161 She
submitted her identity photograph in which she was wearing the Islamic
headscarf.162 The university administration refused to grant the student her
certificate unless she submitted a photograph that complied with the university’s
policy of no head coverings in the identity photograph.163 The court upheld this
policy noting that “by choosing to pursue her higher education in a secular
university a student submits to those university rules, which may make the
freedom of students to manifest their religion subject to restrictions as to
place and manner intended to ensure harmonious coexistence between
students of different beliefs.”164 Furthermore, “[w]here secular universities
have laid down dress regulations for students, they may ensure that certain
fundamentalist religious movements do not disturb public order in higher
education or impinge on the beliefs of others.”165
In Dahlab v. Switzerland, the European Court of Human Rights upheld a
school policy forbidding educators to wear a headscarf in the performance of
professional duties.166 The applicant, Ms. Dahlab, was a Swiss national and
primary school teacher who converted to Islam and began regularly wearing the
Islamic headscarf while teaching.167 After being informed that she could no
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Id. at 451.
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longer wear the Islamic headscarf at work, Ms. Dahlab initiated the suit alleging
that the school policy violated her right to religious expression under Article 9 of
the ECHR.168 In a well-formed opinion, the court perfectly summarized the core
of the issue that this Comment raises: “[P]rohibiting the appellant from wearing
a headscarf forces her to make a difficult choice between disregarding what she
considers to be an important precept laid down by her religion and running the
risk of no longer being able to teach in State schools.”169 The Court determined,
however, that the measure prohibiting Ms. Dahlab from wearing a headscarf
while teaching was “justified in principle and proportionate to the stated aim of
protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public order and public safety. . . .
[and] was ‘necessary in a democratic society.’”170 The court specifically noted
how Ms. Dahlab taught very young children and that, as a powerful religious
symbol, “it cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have
some kind of proselytising effect.”171 Therefore, the court found that it is
especially important that educators discharge their duties while remaining
denominationally neutral.172
The running theme thus far suggests that individuals indeed have a
legitimate legal interest in wearing religious clothing and symbols in the
workplace, but that this individualized interest is outweighed by state interests of
secularism,173 image neutrality,174 and maintaining public order.175 As the
aforementioned cases involved state actors to which the ECHR directly applies,
the case for legally requiring private employers, to whom the ECHR does not
directly apply, to allow religious symbols and attire to be worn in the workplace
becomes a markedly weaker case. If states have an overriding legal interest in
image neutrality and associated spheres over religious expression, it is difficult to
ascertain how a private employer, such as G4S, would not be able to assert a
similar overriding legal interest in image neutrality. Courts have already adopted
the position that religious expression can be limited by an interest in image
neutrality, because such a limitation qualifies under Article 9(2) of the ECHR as
“necessary in a democratic society. . . ”176
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Yet a case could be made that an interest in image neutrality by a private
employer fails to rise to the same level of significance of such a policy at the
state level. The simple case would be to compare a policy barring religious
apparel in the workplace to the same policy in a school setting, such as was at
issue in Dahlab v. Switzerland.177 The critical interest in a school setting involves
the unwarranted imposition of religious beliefs from a position of authority on
impressionable young children. No such critical interest is present in the context
of a private employer doing business with the general public. As a result, the
justifications for allowing a private employer to implement such a policy are far
less apparent.
The harder case would be to consider whether there is a substantial enough
difference between a university setting and a private employer setting to
encourage a different analytical outcome. There certainly is an apparent danger
in creating the appearance that a state sponsors or favors a particular religious
set. Without a baseline of ideological neutrality, state institutions could appear to
promote a specific religion(s) and this could affect individuals’ willingness to
demonstrate non-sponsored religious beliefs. This, in turn, could create a chilling
effect that would stifle the free exchange of ideas and thus result in decreased
societal wellbeing.
In the university setting, present in Sahin v. Turkey178 and Karaduman v.
Turkey,179 it is readily apparent how preserving the free exchange of ideas in a
welcoming, non-hostile environment is a genuine legitimate interest. It also
cannot be denied that religious dress carries a powerful symbolic effect. For
example, familiar clothing practices in Europe include “[t]he Jewish kippa . . . the
Hassidic way of clothing . . . Sikh men [who] always wear the turban in public and
at meal times and [] [S]ikh women wear the shalwar kammez, which is a long tunic
and matching trousers,” and of course the Islamic head coverings frequently
worn by Muslim women.180 It is common for religious persons to be publicly
identified through clothing which identifies the wearer as the follower of a
particular faith.181 Therefore, the state interest in preserving an image of
ideological neutrality at state universities and other state institutions is
understandably important. Without this visage of neutrality, concerns over state
favoritism would surely arise. A critical mass of individuals wearing similar
religious attire can give the impression that those individuals represent what the
university accepts as “the appropriate” religious background that students are
177
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expected to have. This could result in the previously mentioned chilling effect
on openly displaying alternative religious beliefs and practices. Although the
concerns from Dahlab v. Switzerland182 regarding impressionable young children
are not present in the state university context, the argument for ideological
neutrality becomes even stronger when applied directly to faculty and other
government employees. The ills of perceived favoritism are arguably enhanced
exponentially if the state appears to be favoring one religious group or another
through its hiring decisions.
The ECJ determined that G4S had a legitimate aim in establishing a
specific company image that involved ideological neutrality.183 However, unlike
the justification for ideological neutrality in the university context, it is unclear
why G4S’s desire for a specific company image is a right that warrants a
limitation on religious expression—this limitation hardly seems “necessary in a
democratic society”184 unless the employer’s right to establish a specific company
image is a more valuable right than that of religious expression. Presumably,
G4S could operate just as efficiently and without causing a breakdown of society
by adopting a specific company image of diverse inclusion as opposed to an
image of ideological neutrality. A Muslim woman, on the other hand, has no
effective alternative except to not work at G4S. As such, G4S’s legitimate aim is
an interest that is seemingly outweighed by the competing interest.
Furthermore, recall that Article 18(3) of the ICCPR states that: “Freedom
to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as
are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” 185 As one scholar
argues, “[p]ublic safety, order, health, morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others’ are matters in which the public as a whole has a stake . . .”186
If one adopts such criteria, an employer’s private interest in the image of his or
her company would not give rise to a situation that warrants limiting an
individual’s right to religious expression. On the other hand, society as a whole
does hold an interest in the ideological neutrality of its state-sponsored
institutions, such as schools and universities, for the reasons previously argued.
This kind of framework would give rise to a justifiable difference of treatment
when weighing the competing interests, dependent on the context. As such, a
private employer’s policy that bans the wearing of religious attire in the
182
183
184
185
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European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 18, at art. 9(2).
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workplace should be an interest treated with less deference than an interest
society as a whole has a stake in, such as ideological neutrality of state
institutions. Therefore, the argument that a private employer’s interest in
running a business in a specific fashion is a “fundamental right” becomes a
weaker stance. Since freedom of religious expression is inarguably a fundamental
human right under international law, the right which is truly fundamental should
win out over any lesser, non-fundamental rights.
The key point to remember is that any limitation on religious expression
must be necessary per international law.187 Revisiting application of the ECHR,
as Joan Squelch explains, “the limitation or interference must be prescribed by
law, [i.e.], have a basis in law and be necessary in a democratic society.”188
Further, courts have held that “there must be a ‘pressing social need’ for the
interference” in order for the limitation to be “necessary.”189 However, this idea
of a “pressing social need” seems to be at odds with how the ECJ defined
“legitimate aim.” As part of its holding in Samira Achbita v. G4S, the ECJ states:
[A]n internal rule of a private undertaking may constitute indirect
discrimination . . . if it is established that the apparently neutral obligation it
imposes results, in fact, in persons adhering to a particular religion or belief
being put at a particular disadvantage, unless it is objectively justified by a
legitimate aim, such as the pursuit by the employer, in its relations with its
customers, of a policy of political, philosophical and religious neutrality, and
the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary . . .190

Although this is the only example of a “legitimate aim” the court gives, the
simple desire of a company to present an image of religious neutrality
arguably does not rise to the level of a pressing social need. This is
especially true considering one can achieve the same effect as an image of
religious neutrality by either posting disclaimers around the place of
business, or by simply hiring individuals of various faiths and allowing all
to display religious symbols or wear their faith’s corresponding religious
attire. Once again, the ECJ’s conceptualization of “legitimate aim” tugs
against the international law concept of a “necessary” limitation.
Opponents of the ECJ’s ruling have openly disagreed with the “assessment
187
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189
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that the aim pursued by the ban imposed by G4S was legitimate, necessary
and proportionate.”191

V. C ONCLUSION
This concluding section offers some final analyses and suggests
potential solutions to the disparity between broader international law and
E.U. law. A primary concern is how Directive 2000/78 divides
discrimination into two categories: direct discrimination and indirect
discrimination.192 This granular approach may lead to instances where an
employer can discriminate against an individual by advancing a legitimate
aim that otherwise would not be legally possible.193 If, instead, the policy
was gauged simply by a metric of whether it results in undue
discrimination, regardless whether the policy has “as its purpose or as its
effect”194 the discriminatory result, this would provide stronger protections
for religious expression. Of course, this approach would require a radical
departure from the current state of E.U. law, with nothing short of a
rewrite of Directive 2000/78.
A. Reinterpreting “Direct” Discrimination
A simpler approach would be to interpret “direct” discrimination to
include policies that, ex ante, will clearly lead to a disparate impact on
members of various religions. G4S implemented their employee policy with
full knowledge that the policy would place little burden upon followers of
religions without clothing mandates, atheists, and secular individuals. At
the same time, G4S was aware of the heavy burden this policy places on
Muslim women and others who follow religions with clothing mandates.
Because G4S knew of the policy’s disparate effect before it was
implemented, such a policy could logically be deemed a form of direct
discrimination. At the very least G4S was cognizant of the discriminatory
effect their policy would have on individuals such as Ms. Achbita. This
solution would strengthen protections for religious expression since an
employer cannot be excused for direct discrimination under Directive
2000/78 as doing so would violate the principle of equal treatment.195
191
192
193
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Although this is perhaps the simplest solution to the issue, it is likely
the most untenable. The challenge would not only be in determining
whether it is or can be known ex ante that a policy is discriminatory, but
also in reaching legal determinations concerning those policies that align
with existing law for when a state interest overrides discriminatory impact.
This solution also ignores the relevant interest of the business owner in
establishing an ideological-neutral image, which the ECJ has determined
constitutes a legitimate aim.196 Furthermore, this approach would also
substantially blur the lines between direct and indirect discrimination
making categorization of any given policy vastly more difficult.
B. A

Stronger
Focus
Fundamental Rights

on

Necessary

Limitations

and

A second solution would be to interpret both “legitimate aim” and
acceptable “limitations” on the freedom of religious expression strictly in
line with Article 18 of the ICCPR.197 Article 18 of the ICCPR requires any
limitation on the freedom of religious expression to be both (1) prescribed
by law and (2) necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.198 Such an approach could
be simply applied to policies such as G4S’s. There is a strong case that
G4S’s employment policy will disparately impact Muslim women, such as
Ms. Achbita, and thus constitutes indirect discrimination. Under a simple
analysis, a court would likely determine that such a policy is not necessary to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others. As such, it is not a “legitimate aim” for an employer to
adopt. Following this approach, G4S’s policy is indirectly discriminatory
and does not raise a substantial overriding interest that warrants the
limitation on freedom of religious expression. Thus, such a policy cannot
stand.
Of course this second approach assumes that an employer’s right to
run his or her business in the fashion they desire is not itself a fundamental
right. It further assumes that courts are willing to adopt a more proactive
approach to fulfilling affirmative duties under international law by
maximizing protections for religious expression rather than relying solely
on their current domestic counterparts. However, a benefit to this
approach is that it would be the most workable solution as it would
196
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continue to allow for the distinction between direct and indirect
discrimination as it exists in E.U. case law and under the Framework
Directive of Directive 2000/78.199
C. Lawful, Individually -Exercisable Exemptions
A final approach to the issue is recognizing that disparate treatment
of those with certain beliefs, even by a seemingly neutral employment
provision, constitutes general discrimination. Therefore, a broad
interpretation of international and E.U. law inherently requires exemptions
for individuals thus affected. As Amy Dunne notes:
Religious exemptions in pluralist democracies . . . are indispensable to the
preservation of religious plurality. Tolerance, particularly when plurality
means that society will comprise of persons unable to comply with certain
laws for religious reasons, is expressed through the granting of exemptions
from laws which would force a practitioner to violate their mandated
beliefs. Providing for plurality of belief but denying practitioners the ability
to fulfil the mandates of their beliefs would constitute an empty tolerance.200

The primary benefit of protecting freedom of religious expression through
exemptions is how malleable this approach could be. For example, rather than
advocate that a problematic policy as a whole must fail because it is
discriminatory, such a policy can stand but additionally allow for affirmative
exemptions for interested individuals belonging to religious groups who are
adversely affected. This approach would be workable whether such exemptions
are newly established affirmative exemptions or a position is adopted that such
exemptions are implied already under existing international law. Under this
regime, if an employer’s policy produces a disparate impact, the policy as a
whole can remain yet the particular individual whose religious beliefs conflict
with the general policy can automatically qualify for a legal exemption. Such
automatic legal protection does have the potential to be abused, but the relevant
legal regime could further allow for employers to terminate the abusing
employee with impunity upon a showing of bad faith.
Under an alternative approach, it is not necessary to introduce changes to
current law in the form of an array of affirmative exemptions. Current
international law can be interpreted as inherently requiring such exemptions by
its de facto ban on discrimination. This interpretation views exemptions as preexisting under current international law, even if not previously utilized to date,
rather than as entirely new solutions to the present problem. Such a solution,
199
200
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although admittedly a bold proposal, would be simple and would be particularly
well-suited to protect the beliefs and religious practices of members of a
minority religion. The primary downside of such an approach, however, is that
the solution could burden employers by making their policies that are designed
to generate an image of religious neutrality entirely ineffective in the presence of
one outwardly religious employee.
Whatever direction the ECJ takes moving forward, it is undeniable that
individuals like Ms. Achbita are placed in a terrible predicament when faced with
employee policies that directly conflict with one’s religious mandates. Should
such policies become the rule rather than the exception, employment itself will
become difficult, if not ultimately unattainable, for many pious individuals.
These considerations bolster the baseline statement that freedom of religious
expression is a fundamental human right. As enshrined in the dictates of
international law, such a fundamental human right should only be limited when
absolutely necessary. Ms. Achbita’s wearing of a headscarf in the workplace
harmed no one. Should Ms. Achbita find future, non-discriminating
employment and is thereinafter allowed to wear the hijab in her new workplace,
our society will surely continue to function.
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